Will Iran target a Arab country on August 26, 2026?

Logged 23 Aug 2026, 14:34 UTC · Brier 0.0017

• The qualifying set is broad and includes Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Lebanon, where Iran has plausible targets and prior missile activity, so the rate is above a naive ‘Iran attacks an Arab state’ baseline; however proxies, drones unless counted as air strikes, and non-Arab Israel do not qualify.
• Time-decay is material: with only four days to a single AST calendar date, the absence in the prompt of confirmed mobilization, NOTAMs, evacuations or explicit timed threats keeps the estimate near a crisis-adjusted prior rather than a war-footing probability.
• My independent estimate is below the 7.5% market price; the divergence is plausibly a named-date/rumor premium or information I do not have, but the narrow resolution window argues against paying too much for vague tension.

What would change it: Credible evidence before Aug 25 AST of timed Iranian strike preparations—IRGC missile dispersal, airspace closures, embassy/base evacuations, or an explicit threat for Aug 26—would sharply raise the estimate, while quiet through Aug 25 would push it toward the low base rate.

-3.4 probability points from the market at generation · low confidence · Polymarket

Base rate: Direct Iranian air or ballistic-missile strikes into Arab League territory are rare, on the order of a few qualifying days per decade outside active war, though Iraq/Syria strikes make the daily rate nonzero.

Chosen by hand.